Identification of intra-household resource allocation: extensions and alternative approaches. by Fong, Yuk-fai. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Identification of Intra-household Resource AUocation: 
Extensions and Alternative Approaches 
Yuk-fai Fong 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Division ofEconomics 
of 
The Graduate School 
of 
The Chinese University ofHong Kong 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
The Degree ofMaster ofPhilosophy 
August 1996 
/ ^ ^ ^ ,,/統系馆書圖\，、 
|fZZ3!) • 
\ ^ K U_SITY J _ j 
>^ kLIBRARY SYSTEWy^ ^ 
^ ^ P / 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
1. Introduction p.l 
2. Review of Related Literature and Motivation of Research 
2.1 Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) p.6 
2.2 Chiappori (1992) p.9 
2.3 Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1993) p.lO 
2.4 Motivation of Research p. 11 
3. The Identification of non-assignable consumption 
3.1 Extension from Previous Results p. 15 
3.2 An Alternative Approach p. 18 
4. Identification in case of Incomplete Observation of Private 
Expenditure 
4.1 The BBCL Approach p.22 
4.2 An Alternative Approach ofIdentification p.24 
4.3 Liclusion ofExogenous variables in Sharing Rule: Structural p.30 
vs. Reduced form 
4.4 Test for Omission of Some Items in the Total Private p.35 
Expenditure 
4.5 Designation ofNature of Goods~A Remark p.36 
5. Extension to Include Private Leisure as a Choice Variable of 
Individuals 
5.1 Difficulties in Identification of Sharing Rule of Total Private p • 3 8 
Expenditure in a Framework ofFree Labor Choice 
5.2 Identification of Sharing Rule of Total Private Expenditure p.41 
Without Observation of Private Leisure 
5.3 Identification of Sharing Rule in Structural Form with the p.46 
Observation ofUneamed Licomes 
6. Possibility of Identifying the Sharing Rule of Total Private p.49 
Expenditure under Incomplete Observation of Consumption 
of Commodities 
6.1 Identification of p{^ p.50 
7. Parametric Examples for Illustration 
7.1 Example I p.57 
7.2 Example E p.61 




I would like to express my heartiest gratitude to the Panel members of this thesis 
including Prof. William Chan, Prof. Chong-kee Yip and Prof. Junsen Zhang for their 
devotion of precious time. 
I am especially indebted to Prof. Zhang, who is also my supervisor. Without his 
continuous guidance and profound contribution throughout the entire process ofresearch, 
this thesis would not have been up to this standard. His keen eyes always dicovered my 
mistakes and his sharp mind always led me to the right path. There is no doubt that any 
finding of this thesis contains his insightful advice. 
Besides, I am deeply beholden to Prof. Michael McAleer. His kindest encouragement 
and support were crucial in building up my confidence to cope with all the difficulties I 
have been confronted with at different stages of research. I would also like to convey my 
thanks to the participants ofthe Econometric Society Australasian Meeting 1996 for their 
valuable comments when a paper co-authored by Prof. Zhang and me was presented in 
Perth. Moreover, I sincerely acknowledge the support from friends in the graduate school 
including Ho-sing Mak, Hau-yin Kam, Wing-kai Kwan, Yun-kwong Kwok, Kwok-keung 
Siu, Hong-man Wong, and Kwok-choi Wong, etc. With the inspiring teachers and these 
friends, I have enjoyed two years of fruitful intellectual life in the Department of 
Economics of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Last but not least, I would like to 
thank Ka-fung Ng and my family for their warmest concem and thorough understanding 
in all aspects. 
Identification of Intra-household Resource Allocation: 
Extensions and Alternative Approaches 
Abstract 
Li conventional so-called "unitary" models, a single utility function is assumed to exist 
for a household of more than one member. Li recent years, however, the "unitary" 
models have been challenged and much research has been undertaken on the non-
unitary framework of family decision making. Some of this research demonstrates the 
methods of identifying the sharing rule of total private expenditure assuming the 
observation of an assignable good and total private expenditure at the household level. 
It is shown that the effects on the sharing mle of those factors affecting the sharing 
rule but not the preference or the budget set are identified under certain assumptions. 
Li the present thesis, the identification is extended from the aggregate expenditure 
level to each member's consumption of any (group of) non-assignable good(s). This 
assignment of non-assignable goods is useful for policy makers when they are 
designing gender-specific family-support programs. Household surveys are often not 
comprehensive enough to include all private expenditures. Li this case, identification 
of the sharing function of the observed subset of private expenditure requires 
additional assumption or a new approach. Applying the previous approach of 
identification, a further assumption, namely that the unobserved private goods are 
separable from the observed subset in individuals' sub-utility functions, is required. 
Provided that we are only interested in the net effects of exogenous factors on the 
sharing rule, this additional assumption can be relaxed applying the new approach of 
identification developed in this thesis. Besides, we also develop a test for the omission 
of observations on private expenditure and the separability of sub-utility functions 
with respect to observable and unobservable private goods. Furthermore, this thesis 
extends the framework to include leisure as one ofthe choice variables of individuals 
and allows leisure to be partly public in nature. Li this more general framework where 
total private expenditure is unobservable, we first develop a method of identifying the 
net effect of exogenous factors on individuals' unobservable private leisure and apply 
this method to further identify the net effect of these factors on the sharing rule of total 
private expenditure without the observation of total private expenditure. An direct 
implication is that the public leisure of a couple is also identified. Afterward, a 
method of identification of the sharing rule in structural form is developed with the 
observation of individual's control over non-eamed incomes. 
1. Introduction 
The economic modeling of the household behavior starts earlier than thirty years 
ago when Becker (1964) extends the neoclassical model of individual consumption 
demand to families. Becker (1965) also enriches his analysis by considering the family 
as a production unit as well as a consumption unit. Li the latter paper, he assumes that 
households combine market goods and time to generate commodities which directly 
enter the household utility. Li this model, a single utility function is used to represent 
the welfare of a family and such representative welfare is maximized by pooling all 
resources. This is usually referred as the unitary model, neoclassical model or income 
pooling hypothesis nowadays. The concept of altruism introduced by Becker (1981) 
has developed a ground for the pooling hypothesis. This neoclassical model of 
household behavior is very useful in explaining a wide range of phenomena including 
the negative relationship between fertility and women's market wage rates (Dolton 
and Makepeace [1987]), the positive relation between men's wage rate and fertility 
and the negative relation between husbands' wage rate and the wife's labor supply 
studied by Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977). The strong forecasting and explanatory 
power of the neoclassical model once makes it a common tool for evaluating some 
public finance issues and modeling household behaviors. 
Despite its wide range of applications, the neoclassical model is recently criticized 
for its understatement of intra-household heterogeneity. This model cannot take into 
account the fact that family behaviors are collective decisions made by a group of 
people possessing different utilities and bargaining power instead of an dictator's will. 
This drawback of the model disables it from explaining the empirical fact that 
unearned incomes under the control of different agents in a family impose different 
effects on household demands. The negligence of bargaining power of members also 
weakens its power of explaining the decision ofmarital status. Several tests have been 
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performed by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), Senauer, Garcia, and Jacinto (1988)， 
Grossbard-Schechtman and Neuman (1988), Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990). It is 
generally accepted that more resources will be allocated to a member if he/she has 
better option outside the marriage or more contribution of income to the family. These 
pieces of evidence are inconsistent with the implications of the income pooling 
hypothesis. Li other words, all these tests performed reject the income pooling 
hypothesis or the neoclassical model and suggest that a more general model should be 
set up to replace the conventional one. 
McElroy and Homey (1981) apply the Nash (1953) solution to a framework 
consisting oftwo-person households aiming at generalizing the household demand. At 
about the same time, Manser and Brown (1980) apply the Kalai and Smorodinsky's 
solutions as well as the Nash solution in the study of marriage and household 
decision-making. These generalized approaches suggest tests for the neoclassical 
model and allow individual characteristics other than tastes and comparative 
advantages to play a role in affecting the decisions made by a family. The concept of 
"threat point" in the Nash solution which corresponds exactly to the welfare of staying 
single or choosing to divorce is once extensively applied in the studies ofthe marriage 
market. An example which demonstrates these applications is the work by McElroy 
(1985) in which the labor force participation, hours of work and family structure are 
jointly determined. Another example of application of a bargaining solution (Separate 
Spheres) in determination of marital status is Lundberg and Pollak (1993). 
McElroy and Homey (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980) claim that the 
implications of the Nash bargained model not only provide basis for the test of the 
neoclassical income pooling hypothesis but also contain testable implications on its 
own. However, the comment from Chiappori (1988a) on McElroy and Homey (1981) 
criticizes that the rejection of neoclassical model does not entitle them to conclude on 
the Nash bargained model and there contains no falsifiable restriction in the Nash 
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solution which distinguishes it from a broader family of Pareto efficient settings. The 
criticism is partly based on the argument that the threat point which is represented by 
the indirect utility function outside the marriage is not estimable. Chiappori also 
suggests that it would be more appropriate to simply assume Pareto efficiency while 
this Nash-bargained model actually imposes no further empirical restrictions. 
Although McElroy (1988 and 1990) replies that with better data, it is still possible to 
estimate the sensitivity of the indirect utility function to "extrahousehold 
environmental parameters" (EEPs thereafter following McElroy,s [1990] notation) 
based on a separate sample of divorced household and thus the Nash hypotheses can 
be tested, these tests are still left undone. This reply receives further criticism from 
Chiappori (1991,1992) on the assumption that preferences are not affected by the 
marital status. It is commented as a rather strong hypothesis. The other problem is that 
for Nash bargaining hypothesis to be testable, it requires the observation of cardinal 
preference. However, an independent estimation can only provide an ordinal 
representation of indirect utilities. 
Different from the Nash bargained setting, Chiappori (1988b, 1992) presents a two-
member household model where each member consumes one purely private 
consumption good and leisure while the time remained is supplied as labor. Assuming 
egoistic preference (extendible to caring preference), it is proved that the sole 
assumption of efficiency ofthe family decisions is enough to imply the existence of a 
sharing rule. It is also shown that this efficient allocation of resources can be 
interpreted as the outcome of a two stage budgeting process based on the concept of 
separability in utility functions. This separability assumption has been very popular 
(e.g. Lazear and Michael [1988] and Deaton et al. [1989]) “for its analytical 
convenience" as stated by Gronau (1991). At the first stage, the income resources are 
allocated to members for private expenditure according to a sharing rule. At the 
second stage, each member independently maximizes hisy^er own utility given the 
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expenditure share obtained at the first stage. It is asserted that the decision process can 
be recovered if we can observe how much oflabor is supplied by each member. 
Li line with Chiappori's (1988b, 1992) model, Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori 
and Lechene (1993) derive an expression for the effect of change in each member's 
expenditure share on his/her consumption of a non-assignable good in terms of the 
partials of the sharing rule. 
Later, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) extend this 
framework to a multiple commodity (excluding leisure, however) model which 
includes public goods and allows for caring preferences. Through imposing some 
necessary assumptions on this richer framework, they systematically develop a 
method of identifying the sharing rule under the situation that there exists one 
assignable or two exclusive private goods (one for each person). It is asserted that all 
the partial derivatives of the sharing rule can be identified and thus the sharing rule 
itself can be identified up to a constant. 
Recently, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) extend to consider a very 
general framework of household decision making where no a priori restriction on 
individual preferences is imposed. Li such a framework, they develop a test for 
collective rationality (efficiency) of household demands. Furthermore, a test for the 
separability properties of individual preferences is also developed. These separability 
properties are necessary for the existence of sharing rule. Since we focus on the 
identification of the sharing rule in this thesis, the separability properties are taken for 
granted like in the previous literature. Compared with the work of Bourguignon, 
Browning and Chiappori (1995), this thesis extends in a different direction focusing 
on the identification of sharing rule in case of unobservability of total private 
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expenditure^which is always the case if we allow leisure to be a choice variable and 
partly public in nature. 
Since this thesis is extended from the works ofBourguignon, Browning, Chiappori 
and Lechene, a detailed review of some of their works closely related to this thesis is 
necessary. This will be carried out in next section, where motivation of writing this 
thesis will be elaborated as well. 
1 hi Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995), total private expenditure is always assumed to be 
observable even when they consider the case that only one or two private goods are observed at 
household level, (see p.16-17) 
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2. Review of Related Literature and Motivation of Research 
2.1 Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) (thereafter BBCL) 
Although it is Chiappori (1988b，1992) who introduces the sharing rule 
interpretation ofhousehold behaviors and first develops the method of identifying the 
sharing rule. We choose to review the work of BBCL first since this thesis is an 
extension fi:om their richer framework, ln the framework of BBCL, each family 
consists oftwo members, A and B. Each of them consumes a vector ofprivate goods, 
q' (i = A, B) on his/her own and together consume a vector of public goods, Q which 
directly provides utility for both of them. The prices of the private and public goods 
are respectively p and P. The cooperative setting implies that in the family, all 
decisions made achieve Pareto optimal. Under this assumption of efficiency and the 
following assumptions: 
i) there exist some private goods, 
ii) members process caring preferences; 
If the utility ofmember i is denoted by U\ 
[ / ' = F p ( q � Q ) , v 1 q'，Q ) ) , i^A,B, (2.1) 
where v^ and / denote each member's sub-utility function which is directly 
generated from the consumption ofthat member, and 
iii) private goods are separable from public goods in each member's sub-utility 
function: 
v ' ( q � Q ) = r(4q,)，Q), (2.2) 
it is proved that there exists a sharing rule. Li other words, the efficient allocation of 
resources of a family can be interpreted as the result of a two stage decision process 
which is described as below. 
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At the first stage the expenditure on public goods, P'Q is determined and the 
remained budget is apportioned between members for private consumption according 
to a predetermined sharing rule which decides on members' shares (denoted by x^ and 
x^) for private expenditure. The sharing rule is a function of the observed total private 
expenditure, x，and a vector of exogenous variables, namely z which includes 
0 _ incomes ofboth members and EEPs: 
x'=xp, (2.3a) 
x^=x( l - /7 ) , and (2.3b) 
p = p{x,z). (2.3c) 
At the second stage, based on the expenditure share obtained, each member 
maximizes his/her own utility. It can be written formally as: 
Y^^ x V' =v'(qSQ) (2.4a) 
subjectto p ' q = x ' , i=A，B. (2.4b) 
In their paper, a method of identifying the sharing rule of the total private 
expenditure is developed. Li order to make identification feasible, they also assume 
that: 
iv) one private good is assignable or two private goods are exclusive.^ 
V) total private expenditure is observable.^ 
Under these additional assumptions, it is proved that the sharing rule of total 
private expenditure specified in (2.3) can be identified up to an additive constant 
while the partials of the sharing functions written in forms of x'(-) or p(-) with respect 
to factors affecting the sharing rule but not the preferences or budgets are completely 
2 Eamed income is used because fixed labor is assumed in BBCL. 
3 According to BBCL, assignable goods and exclusive goods are respectively goods that we can 
observe the individual consumption of each member and goods which are consumed by only the 
husband or wife. 
4 Assumption v is not formally stated in BBCL but is obviously needed for their framework. This thesis 
will examine the importance of this assumption. 
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recovered. It is concluded that "we can identify everything about how intrahousehold 
sharing is affected by factors such as relative ages, incomes, and household total 
^ ^ , ^ ^ � . , 
expenditure." Li the paper, the partials of the sharing rule, ~ ^ and ~~^ are derived 
CX CZj^ 
as follows: 
t ^ ^ , (2.5a) 汰 4 - Lk 
and ^ = L i ^ , (2.5b) 
dZk 汰 
^¾/ i / ^¾ ^C i / ^¾ 
wherez^is an element of z and 4 二 // 众=~~fr~^, ^ = A,B and k = 1,....^ 
dq^jdx, ox |3c 
It follows that "the partials of p(x, z) are also identified."^ 
In the paper, individuals' labor supplies are fixed by including “only couples in 
which both partners work full-time". Then the sharing rule of total private expenditure 
is recovered in a framework of fixed labor/leisure. 
Here explains how the sharing rule is identified through fixing labor. Conditioned 
on the budget for private consumption on commodities (excluding leisure) for 
member i, namely x\ consider the effect of an element in z, namely Zk on individual z's 
demand for a private good: 
M ^ M ^ + ^ ^ + y ^ ^ (2 6) 
dZk — ^ ' dZk dN' dz^ 台 dQ^ dz^ • 
where 7V' is the leisure of member i. 
5 L^ can be rewritten as ^ | ^ where C[ is the consumption on good 1 by member i because 
changes in price is not considered in this model. 
dp _if dx,^ I 
Actually the partial of p with respect to x, — is only identified as x p which is a 
Sx \ dx, y 
function of p itself. 
8 
After adopting assumption iii that private goods and public goods are separable in 
individual's sub-utility functions, the last term will disappear because ^¾!/¾- = 0 for 
all j under the assumption. Further fixing labor (i.e. fixing leisure), the second term 
^ ' 
also drops to zero because . Then it follows that: 
^k 
^ ; ^ ^ ; 3c' (2.7) 
dz>k <^' dZk 
Therefore, all the effect of Zk on q\ is through x' and it is the adequate condition for 
BBCL's method of identification to work out. 
2.2 ChiapDori (1992) 
Jn this earlier paper, the sharing rule is defmed on the family non-labor income. Li 
the paper,;;, wi and w2 respectively denote the family non-labor income, and the wage 
incomes ofmember 1 and 2. Ifwe denote member f s share of non-labor income share 
by —, the Chiappori's version of sharing rule is: 
—=<Wi,W2,_y),and 
^2 =y-g>{w^,w2,y)-
Under this specification, the partials — , - ^ and ^ are identified in a 
W^ <^2 ^ 
framework of firee labor/leisure choice where each member's expenditure share 
(w) + qy^ ) includes each member's consumption on leisure as well. However, the 
assumption that individuals' leisure and all commodities are private make it distant 
from reality. Further review of Chiappori's paper will be continued in section 5 where 
one ofhis findings is applied. 
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2.3 Bourguignon, Browning. Chiappori and Lechene (1993) (thereafter BBCL*) 
In this paper written by the same authors of BBCL, the sharing rule of full income 
is specified as: 
Y; = Y;{y^,y,,Y), (2.8) 
Y = ym ^yf +yo> j = mj 
where Y* is the income share allocated to member j for consumption; yt, yo and 7 
respectively denote the potential income of member i ifhe/she devotes all ofthe time 
endowment to work, the unearned income of the family and the household full income 
respectively. 
Note that the specification of the sharing rule in (2.8) can be presented in a 
equivalent version which is defmed on non-labor income as in Chiappori (1992). Efwe 
denote the share of non-labor income allocated to member j by q)�,the sharing rule of 
non-labor income equivalent to (2.8) is: 
—{ym,少f, Y) = Y； [y^, y,, r)-力，j : m, f • 
Compared with the specification of Chiappori, now the household full income is 
put into the sharing rule in place ofthe non-labor income of the family. On the other 
hand, it can be easily shown that the sharing rule of total private expenditure in BBCL 
collapses to the full income version in BBCL* if leisure is included, z contains only 
y^ a n d � and all goods are assumed to be purely private so that X = 7 . 
Based on the sharing rule specified in (2.8), they derive an expression of 
"individual Engel curve derivatives" in terms of derivatives of the sharing rule as 
follows: 
一 《 《 K l ^ (2 9、 
[ H ^ 7 ^ , (2.9) 
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where F.^  is the rate of change in the consumption of member / o n a non-assignable 
private good with respect to her expenditure share, C, is the household consumption of 
good i, 7is the total expenditure of the family, Y* is the expenditure share allocated to 
the male member andy^ is the income of the male member. 
The derivative, F^ captures the income effect of the change in the expenditure 
share of the wife on her individual consumption of a private good. From the 
expression, it can be observed that if the partials of the sharing rule, dY*^j^ and 
dY^jdy^ are identified, the "individual Engel curve derivative" of the non-assignable 
good is also recovered. The model used in their paper is not as general as that in 
BBCL since preferences are assumed to be egoistic and public goods are excluded. 
Note that what is identified in BBCL* is the sharing rule of full income where leisure 
is included as a purely private good. 
As mentioned above, while the emphasis of BBC is put on constructing tests for 
collective rationality, the only new fmding about the identification of sharing rule is 
that the sharing rule can be identified up to a transformation in case only one 
exclusive good is observed. Since we are more concerned with the case of observing 
one assignable (or two exclusive goods) under which more useful results can be 
obtained, there would not be a sub-section reviewing the findings ofBBC in detail. 
2.4 Motivation ofResearch 
Li BBCL*，the "individual Engel curve derivatives" are recovered. Li this thesis, 
firstly, we extend the result ofBBCL* in the richer framework of BBCL and combine 
with the results ofBBCL to assign the effect ofz on each individual's consumption of 
any non-assignable good. It can be shown that if we wish to recover the effect of z 
following their approach, it is necessary to recover the sharing rule first and thus many 
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steps of estimation have to be carried out. Therefore, one of the purposes ofthis thesis 
is to derive an alternative approach of assigning the effect of z on non-assignable 
individual consumption which is simpler to carry out. (See section 3.) 
Total private expenditure is assumed to be observable in either BBCL or BBCL*. 
However, sometimes, a household survey is not comprehensive enough to provide the 
data of expenditure on every (group of) private good(s). If it is the case, total private 
expenditure is not observable and one of the assumptions adopted by BBCL is 
violated. Under this situation, it would be aimed at recovering the sharing function 
which determines how to allocate the observed subset of private goods to each 
member. However, the approach of BBCL may not directly apply for this purpose. It 
will be demonstrated that in order to validate their method under the omission of 
observation, it entails an additional assumption of separability between the observable 
and unobservable private goods in the individual's sub-utility functions. Another 
purpose of the present thesis is to suggest a method of identification of the sharing 
function for the observable private expenditure which relaxes this assumption. It will 
be proved that if we are concerned with the net effect of z on the sharing function, this 
additional assumption is not necessary even if the total private expenditure is not 
observed. Then we are interested to know whether we can detect if there is omission 
of observation of private expenditure. It will be shown that the answer is positive. A 
test is developed in this thesis through comparison of the results obtained from 
different methods of identification. (See section 4.) 
Furthermore, in BBCL, the term “total private expenditure" refers to the budget for 
expenditure on private goods and services which does not include consumption of 
leisure which is: 
C ^ = w ^ N ^ + w , N \ (2.10) 
where w, and N' denote respectively the wage rate and leisure of member i. 
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If we allow leisure to be one ofthe choice variables of individuals, the sharing rule 
should decide on the private leisure each member and total private expenditure should 
include members' consumption on private leisure. Recovery of sharing mle in such a 
framework of free labor/leisure choice is first carried out by Chiappori (1992) • It is 
proved that the sole observation of labor is enough for recovering the sharing mle of 
unearned income specified as a fixnction of wages and unearned income of the family 
up to a additive constant. Later, BBCL* consider a sharing mle defmed on the full 
income which can be proved to be equivalent to the sharing of unearned income. 
However, the results ofthese papers rely on a rather strong assumption that leisure is 
purely private in nature. Li this thesis, we will try to relax the assumption of pure 
private leisure and allow part of individual leisure to be public in nature. Since we 
cannot tell how much of the leisure is spent privately and how much is spent publicly, 
the total private expenditure including consumption on private leisure becomes 
unobservable. Therefore, the conventional method which requires the observation of 
total private expenditure is not applicable here. Li this thesis, we present a method of 
identifying the net effect of variables affecting expenditure sharing on the 
unobservable private leisure. It follows that, if a household survey is comprehensive 
enough that the only omitted item of private expenditure is private leisure, the net 
effect of z on the sharing rule is identified. It will also be proved that in those cases 
that control of unearned income is reported, the identification of the sharing rule 
written in structural form is also possible in such a framework of free labor/leisure 
choice. Here, all required is a very intuitive assumption. (See section 5.) 
Furthermore, we will explore in this thesis the possibility of identifying the sharing 
rule of the total private expenditure when there is omission of observation of private 
consumption other than private leisure. A general discussion on the condition for 
identifiability will be carried out. A special case will then be delivered to give light to 
the possibility of identification. (See section 6.) 
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The rest of the thesis will be devoted to providing some algebraic examples for 
illustration of the new methods of identification we develop here. (See section 7.) 
Finally, conclusion on our findings will be drawn. (See section 8.) 
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3. The Identification of non-assignable consumption 
ln this section, we introduce two methods of assigning the effects of z on 
individual consumption on a non-assignable good. One of them is extended from one 
of the findings in BBCL* combined with the identification of sharing rule developed 
in BBCL. On the other hand, an alternative approach of assignment which dose not 
rely on the identification of the sharing rule will be derived. Although the partials 
recovered are conditioned on x，the net effects of z on the individual consumption of 
non-assignable goods will be derived as well. The net effect is especially of the 
concem of this thesis because it provides further knowledge of intra-household 
demands which is very useful for designing gender-specific family-support programs. 
3.1 Extension from Previous Results 
In BBCL*, a model without public goods is used. Li such a model, all the income 
resources are allocated to members for them to consume private goods independently. 
Here, their model is extended to include public goods and it is also allowed for caring 
preferences. However, as in BBCL, the labor supply is fixed at full-time level. For 
convenience of description and compatibility with BBCL, some notations of BBCL* 
are modified. 
Here is the extended version of BBCL*. The total income of the family includes 
each member's wage income at full time level and the unearned income ofthe family: 
I = w^A + w^A + /o, (3.1) 
where Wi, A and / � a r e respectively /'s wage rate, the labor supply at full-time level 
and the family's unearned income. 
Again it is a two stage model. At the first stage, consumption of public good, P'Q is 
decided and the remained budget, x=(/-P'Q) is allocated to each member for private 
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expenditure. The shares are respectively, x^ and x^. No matter how the budget is 
shared, it must satisfy the adding up condition that 
x ^ + x ' = I - P ^ Q . (3.2) 
At the second stage, each member decides on his/her private consumption given 
the budget share, x�This gives the Engel curve of each member in consuming goody: 
q=F|(x'(z^x)). 
The consumption function of good j at household level follows as: 
C ^ = F ; [ x \ x , x ) y F ^ [ x \ z , x ) ) , (3.3) 
Differentiating (3.3) with respect to an element in z, namely Zk, we have: 
H ^ i ( (3.4a) 
dz� dx^ dz^ dx^ dz^ 
Similarly, differentiating (3.3) with respect to x, it follows that: 
a ^ i ( (3.4b) 
3c dx^ dx 3c^ dc 
Solving equations (3.4a) and (3.4b), it is obtained that: 
^ J ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ' ' ( ^ ^ _ ^ ^ (3 5a) 
3c^ ^<¾ 3c dz^ dx J V ^k ^ ^k 汰」 
, ^ F ； f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 c ' Y ( ^ j ^ ' 3c' ^ j ] 门仏、 
and ——J—二 . (^j.jDj 
dx^ V dz^ dx dz^ 3c y V dx dz^ dx dz^ J 
Here, the "individual Engel curve derivatives" are written in terms of the 
derivatives ofthe sharing functions and the derivatives of the household consumption 
function of the non-assignable good. Since the derivatives of the sharing rule are 
proved to be identifiable if there exists one assignable good in BBCL, it can be 
concluded that the "individual Engel derivatives" are also identified if we apply the 
equations stated above. 
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If Zk only affects the demand of individual i for private good j through income 
effect or in other words through changing x\ we have: 
_ ^ = ^ f (3.6a) 
dzj^ 3ci dz^ 
拉=患义 (3.6b) 
dK 3c' 3c 
Substituting (3.5) into the above equations, it follows immediately that: 
^ ; = r ^ ^ _ f ^ - 1 fe^_《匈 ^ (3 7a) 
dZk V ^k ^ ^k ^ J V ^k ^ ^k ^ J ^k 
^ J ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ' ' f ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ^ (3 7b) 
( ¾ V dzy^ dx di^ dx y v dz^ dx dz^ dx y dz^ 
dCf = ( ^ ^ _《幻—1 [ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ^ (3 7c) 
3c V ^k ^ ^k 汰 J V ^k 汰 ^k ^ / ^ 
, ^ ； (ac' ac' 3c' 3c'Y(^j 3c' 3c' ^J^ 3c' , . _ and ~~— = . (3.7d) 
3c V ^k ^ ^k ^ / V ^k ^ ^k 汰 / 汰 
Therefore, through linking the expression of"Engel curves derivatives" derived by 
BBCL* and the identification ofsharing rule developed in BBCL by (3.6), it is shown 
that the partials of individual consumption can always be expressed as estimable 
partials of household demand and identifiable partials of the sharing rule. Note that 
these partial derivatives presented in (3.7a) and (3.7b) do not tell us the net impact of 
change of Zk on individual consumption demands for non-assignable goods because 
the partials are conditioned on total private expenditure, x. However, a change in Zk 
will likely affect x. The net effect? of change in Zk on C) should thus take into account 
the indirect effect via changing x. Formally, it is: 
拉=丞+经1, (3.8) 
dZk dz^ 3c dZk 
7 The notion ofusing "6" to denote the net (or total) effect is adopted from BBCL. (see p.l080) 
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where the second term captures the indirect effect through changing the private 
expenditure. 
汰 
Since ——is estimable, the net effect of the change in Zk on the consumption of 
^k 
individual i on a non-assignable good, C) can be identified by substituting (3.7a-d) 
into (3.8). This assignment of non-assignable demands is very usefiil in providing 
suggestions for policy makers when they are designing gender-specific support 
program aiming at subsidizing or discouraging the consumption of a particular sex on 
a particular good. For example, if zu is a policy instrument, equation (3.8) tells us how 
much of the effect of the policy is directed to the husband's and the wife's 
consumption on a particular non-assignable good of which only the household level of 
consumption is observed. Based on the estimates obtained from the assignment 
process, policy makers can have some idea on how extensive a policy should be in 
order to meet their target ofaffecting individuals' consumption. 
All has been done above is a direct extension firom the results of BBCL and 
BBCL*. As we can see, the derivation relies on the identification ofthe sharing rule in 
advance. In the following subsection, we introduce an alternative approach of 
assigning the individual consumption function of the non-assignable goods. Applying 
this alternative approach, it is not necessary to estimate the derivatives of the sharing 
rule before assigning the non-assignable individual consumption. 
3.2 An Alternative Approach 
Before proceeding, (2.3) is rewritten in a more general form: 
x W M . (3.9) 
]n line with BBCL, assumptions i-iv will be adopted in this subsection. Under these 
assumptions, it follows that: 
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^ = 4 - . a n d (3.10a) 
dZk dx! dz^ 
^ = 4 ^ , (3.10b) 
dx. dx^ dx 
\izk affects individual demands solely through affecting the sharing rule. 
They can be written equivalently as: 
^ = 4 ! , a n d (3.11a) 
dz^ 3c^ dz^ 
丑 =丑乂 （3.11b) 
dx, 3c' 3c， 
because the prices are not affected by Zk or x. 
These further imply that: 
" j / f 漸/ 1 ^ / 
ri _ _ Z ^ _ _ Z ^ _ _ Z ^ n 12) 
k _ W _ W _ i 
/dx K /dx) Z8x 
This holds for individual consumption of both assignable and non-assignable goods 
which are denoted by Ca and C„ respectively. 
The immediate implication of (3.12) is that 
^ ^ X f ^ , a n d (3.13a) 
dz� 3c 
l : L l & , (3.13b) 
dZk dyi 
^Q^ /dz 
Note that L\ and Zf are estimable because they are respectively equal to ^ 1 | ^ 
^^5丨茂 
and ~~“ ‘, k where the denominators and numerators of them can be obtained from 
dC^j3: 
the individual consumption functions of the assignable good. 
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Consider the effects of x and Zk on the household consumption on a non-assignable 
good, Cn： 
^ = ^ + ^ , a n d (3.14a) 
3c 3c 3c 
^经 +经， 
^k ^k ^k ’ 
or after substituting (3.13a) and (3.13b) into it, becoming 
^ = l f ^ + L t ^ . (3.14b) 
(¾ 3c 3c 
Solving (3.14a) and (3.14b)，it is obtained that: 
^ = 7 ? / f l f ^ - ^ l , (3.15a) 
3c V <^ dZk y 
where 7 ? , = ( z f - I ^ ) ' \ 
Therefore, the partial derivative of A's consumption on any non-assignable good 
with respect to x is written in terms of estimable partials. By substitution, other 
partials concerned can be solved as follow: 
化：& —红, (3.15b) 
3c dx 3c 
^ = L t ^ , and (3.15c) 
dZk dx 
^ = L l ^ . (3.15d) 
dZk dx 
As in the previous subsection, the main concem here is the net effect of z on x. 
However, like (3.7), these partials are conditioned on an endogenous variable x. Since 
X can also be affected by the change in Zk and therefore these partials can not reflect 
the net impact of change in Zk on individual demands. The net effect of change in Zk on 
the consumption of individual i on non-assignable good C„ should be obtained by 
substituting (3.15a-d) into: 
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< = < + ^ A , (3.16) 
dz>k dz^ 3c dz^ 
where the second term captures the indirect effect of Zk on C^  through affecting x. 
Note that although this thesis focuses on the assignment of the non-assignable 
individual consumption functions, from (3.10) to (3.12), we can see that identical 
results would be obtained if data at the level of quantity demanded, q, instead ofthe 
amount of consumption, C are used. 
As the results of the previous subsection, (3.16) tells us how each individual's 
demand for a non-assignable good changes in response to the change of an exogenous 
factor which affects expenditure budget and its sharing but not the preferences. 
Applying this alternative approach, we can directly get into assigning individual 
consumption of non-assignable goods without identifying the partials of the sharing 
rule, ^7^yt and 3c'|3c in advance. Actually, the procedure of estimation of the net 
effect of z on individual consumption on the non-assignable goods can be further 
simplified but it is left to be discussed in section 4. 
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4. Identification in case of Incomplete Observation of Private Expenditure 
Either in BBCL or BBCL*, total private expenditure has been assumed to be 
observable. However, we cannot be certain that it is always the case. If a survey is not 
comprehensive enough to report every single item or group of private expenditure of 
the families, then summing over the household consumption of every reported private 
good gives only a subset instead of total of the private expenditure. Li this case, we 
would aim at identifying the sharing function for the observed subset of private 
expenditure. There are two issues of concern in this section. First, we will study 
whether the method introduced by BBCL is applicable for this purpose of recovering 
the sharing fimction within the observed subset of private expenditure. Second, we 
will try to fmd out whether it is possible to test if there is omission ofitems ofprivate 
expenditure. 
4.1 The BBCL Approach 
Although the household survey used in BBCL seems quite comprehensive, ^ items 
of total private expenditure are not always completely covered in household surveys, 
especially in less developed countries. Under this situation, assumption v is violated 
and problem may arise applying their method of identification. However, their method 
ofidentification is still valid under the assumption that: 
vi) observable and unobservable private goods are separable in the sub-utility 
functions of members in the family. 
This additional assumption modifies equation (2.2) into: 
v,(qZ,Q) = ^ q O , _ Q ) , (4.1) 
8 Referring to p.l083 of BBCL (1994), variables included in total non-durable expenditure are "food, 
alcohol, tobacco, services, recreation, and clothing." 
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where q: and q: denote the vectors of observable and unobservable private goods 
while u[ and u[ denote the utilities generated through consumption of these goods 
respectively. 
Now we proceed to explain why such additional assumption is necessary when we 
apply their method of identification in case of incomplete observation oftotal private 
^A ^B 
expenditure. First, note the expression, — + — 二 1 in BBCL. For this equation to 
hold in the case that x reported in a household survey is only a subset of private 
expenditure, it requires that jc^  and x^ are denoting the individuals' shares of 
expenditure on the observed, instead of all private goods because otherwise the partial 
effects would not necessarily add up to one. 
Consider the total effect of Zk (conditioned on x and other elements in z) on 
member /'s individual demand for an observable good, q': 
K ^ f d J ^ i i (42a) 
dz;d^idZk ^ ^ : ^ . t r ^ . ^ . • 
and the effect ofx (conditioned on z) is: 
m ^ a + ^ a (4 2b) 
^ —汝 dx 合尔 ^ ^ ¾ ^ , • 
where Nu and Nq respectively denote the number of unobservable private goods and 
the number of public goods while q[ and Qr respectively denote the quantity 
demanded ofmember i on an unobservable private good and the household demand of 
a public good. 
However, for their method of identification to work out, it requires that: 
( _ a md ^ ' 二 两'汰' 
dz dx! dz dx, 3c^ 3c 
which in tum ensure that the following equality holds: 
^l/^k = ^'/^k • 
dq[jdx, dx'jdx, 
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In other words, the second and third terms of (4.2a) and (4.2b) should be zero. 
Assumption iii already ensures that the third terms to be zero for both (4.2a) and 
(4.2b). However, for the second terms to vanish, adoption of assumption vi is required 
as well. 
Nevertheless, this additional assumption is rather strong. Li the following 
subsection, an alternative approach of identification will be developed. It will be 
proved that if our concem is the net effect of z on the sharing function ofthe observed 
subset, assumption vi can be relaxed. Moreover, it will be shown that this alternative 
approach provides a test for incomplete observation of items of private expenditure. 
4.2 An Alternative Approach ofIdentification 
Before we proceed to the derivation of the alternative method, it is necessary to 
redefme some notations. Li the remainder of this subsection, x denotes the observed 
private expenditure of the family which is not necessarily equal to the total private 
expenditure. The notation for total private expenditure is replaced byXso that (3.9) is 
rewritten as: 
r = X ' ( X , z ) , (4.3a) 
X = X(z,z), (4.3b) 
where z is defmed as in section 2 and z is a vector of exogenous variables other than 
z which affects X but does not get into the sharing rule directly? 
Note thatZwould be unobservable if the observed private expenditure x does not 
cover every single category of private consumption. On the contrary, if a household 
survey is comprehensive enough, then x=X. The share of total private expenditure 
allocated to member i is denoted by X with ^ + ^ = X , which is a function of X and z. 
» 
9 Detailed discussion of the specification of sharing rule will be given in the next subsection. 
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Since this section is concerned with the net effect of z on the sharing rule, the 
sharing rule is rewritten as: 
r=T{z,z). (4.4) 
This is obtained by substituting (4.3b) into (4.3a). Through out this thesis, we name 
(4.4) as the sharing rule oftotal private expenditure in reduced form and (4.3a) as the 
sharing rule of total private expenditure in structural form. Hereafter, the partial 
derivative of X' (-) with respect to Zk represents the net effect of Zk on X' which 
already takes into account the indirect effect through affecting the total private 
expenditure, X. ][n the remainder of this thesis, "tilde" will be used to denote the 
reduced form of a function. 
Similarly, the individual demands are presented in the reduced form: 
� = g ; ( i z ( z , i)， i ) , � r (4.5a) 
g ; = W M . (4-5b) 
Since we do not consider price changes, equivalently, we have: 
q = C ; ( r ( z , z ) , z ) , o r (4.6a) 
C;=C;(z,z) . (4.6b) 
where Cj( ) denotes the consumption function of member i on good j written in 
reduced form. 
Since the consumption function is rewritten in reduced form, the observed subset 
ofprivate expenditure, x will be excluded from the list of independent variables when 
the consumption function is estimated by a statistical method. However, in estimating 
consumption functions in reduced form, z may have to be included as well in addition 
to z in the case that X is not reported. A detailed discussion on the inclusion of 
exogenous variables into the sharing rule will be left to the next subsection where 
some potential candidates ofelements in z will be introduced. 
25 
After all the above fimctional forms are redefmed, first of all, the net effect of 
change in z on individual consumption on non-assignable goods can be identified. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under assumptions i-iv and: 
^^^ j ^  3C^ / 3z j J . k * j J k for at least a pair ofz's, 
^a i^h ^a l^h 
all the partials, which already take into account the indirect effect through X, of each 
member's consumption on any non-assignable goods with respect to z can be 
identified without the observation of total private expenditure. 
Proof. 
Following directly from assumption iii that private and public goods are separable 
in individual sub-utility functions, we have 
x \ ^i I , 
~ ^ = 3 l i = A,B;0=l,2, : ;K (4.7) 
diQ oK ozQ 
where ZQ denotes a variable in z and K is the number of variables in z. 
Here, although the symbol for the partials, � d" is the same as the one in the previous 
sections, it is different in meaning because total private expenditure is controlled in 
the previous sections, while all the partials in this sub-section take into account the 
indirect effect through changingX 
Similar to the previous results, from (4.7) we can derive: 
^cy ^ y i^% 
• 一 /dZk _ / a z , _ / a z , 
4 . - ^ - ^ / - ¾ ‘ ( . ) 
A . / ¾ / ^ ^ 
where i = A, B; a and n respectively denote the assignable good and one ofthe non-
assignable goods. From the left most equality of (4.8), we know that i^> and Zf^ can 
be estimated firom individual consumption functions of the assignable good. 
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Let C^{) , £f(.) and C„() respectively denote A's and B,s and the household 
consumption functions of a non-assignable good n written in reduced forms. Although 
unobservable, (4.8) implies that these restrictions must hold for the non-assignable 
goods: 
/f^^ /f^^ 




where Z ^ , =气 / 产 and Zf, 二 气 ^ 严 are estimated by substituting estimates 
' ' ' 3 K ^ d Z h • 3K^|&^ 
of the partials of the individual consumption functions of the assignable good (in 
reduced forms) into (4.8). 
Consider the effects of Zh and Zk on the household consumption on a non-assignable 
good, Cn ： 
r~~-j r ^ ^ r--J 万 
& = i + i , a n d (4.10a) 
^h ^h ^h 
r ^ r ^ A ‘—^ r% 
化左+么， 
先 &k ^k , 
or from (4.9a) and (4.9b), 
f = ^ - f ^ ^ - f - _ (4-l�b) 
Here, all terms on the left hand side are observable and the terms ( ^ andZf^ are 
estimable. Presented in matrices, (4.10a) and (4.10b) become: 
厂 � n 厂 � A n 
^ 1 te 
先 - 1 1 ^^ (4 i n 
^ — T^ TB /Y^B . y^-^^J 
^n [_^k.h 1众,/2」^n 
_ 屯 J L &h _ 
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It can be solved that 
jrB ^ _ < 赶—二為产 
^h ^k,h _ Lk,h 
=及表參-#"], (4.12a) 
V & h ^ k ) 
where R^  ^ = (zf , - 1{)^ ‘. 
Therefore, the partial derivative of consumption on every non-assignable good by 
agent A with respect to z^ is identified. By substitution, other partials concerned can be 
solved as follow: 
^ n = ^ n ^ n , (4.12b) 
^h ^h ^h , 
* = L t ^ , a n d (4.12c) 
^k ^k 
#B ^B 
~ L i , ^ . (4.12d) 
&k ^h 
Since L\^ and L^^ are estimable as mentioned earlier, there contains no inestimable 
term on the right hand side of(4.12). Li other words, all the net effects of Zh and Zk on 
the individual consumption of any non-assignable goods are recovered. Q.E.D 
The procedure of estimation of the net effects of z^  and Zh on individual private 
consumption of a non-assignable good can be summarized in the following steps of 
estimation: 
Step 1 -Estimation of individual consumption functions for the assignable good 
r ^ • I r ^ . y 
written in reduced form in order to obtain ^ ^ /<^ and <^: /3c. 
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Step 2 -Estimation ofhousehold consumption fimction of the non-assignable good of 
r - w / r - « / 
p^ <Y^ 
our interest in reduced form to obtain ~~- and - ^ . 
^h ^k 
Step 3 -Substitution of estimates obtained from steps 1 and 2 into (4.12) to recover 
the net effect of z on individual consumption of the non-assignable good. 
As we can see, the number of steps for estimating the net effect of z on non-
assignable demands is further reduced compared with the procedures introduced in 
section 3. On one hand, it is not necessary to recover the partials of the sharing rule in 
advance. On the other hand, there is no need to use the information of total private 
expenditure and the net effect is estimated directly without recovering the partials 
conditioned on total private expenditure first. 
After the assignment of consumption on non-assignable goods are fmished, we 
proceed to identify the partials of the sharing function within the observable subset of 
private expenditure. It is a direct implication of Proposition 1 and the result is 
summarized by the following. 
COROLLARY： Under the same assumptions adopted in Proposition 1, the net 
effects of z on the sharing function of the observable subset of private expenditure 
which take into account the indirect effect through X can be identified without the 
observation of total private expenditure, X. 
This result follows immediately from the assignment of the net effect of z on all 
non-assignable goods. All we need to do is adding up all the net effects on an 
individual's consumption of every non-assignable private good and the particular 
assignable private good observed. After that, the net effect of z on the expenditure 
share for individual consumption on observable private goods allocated to each 
member can be obtained as: 
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f = A + J _ ^ , (4.13) 
^e ^e «=1 ^e 
where i=A, B; 0=h, k. 
Note that Nn now denotes the number of non-assignable goods observed instead ofthe 
total number of non-assignable goods. 
4.3 hiclusion of Exogenous variables in Sharing Rule: Structural vs. Reduced 
form 
In this subsection, we will discuss in detail what kind of exogenous variables 
should appear in the sharing mle when it is specified as structural form or reduced 
form. Hereafter, z\, z\, z, and z respectively denote those vectors of exogenous 
variables affecting the MRS's among private goods, the MRS's among public goods, 
the household income and the weighting {ju and {l-ju)) of members' utilities in the 
household welfare function. Note that a variable can be among more than one ofthese 
vectors. For example, if we take children as a public good, education level ofamother 
which affects both the opportunity cost ofchild raising and her wage rate will get into 
both z\ and Zj. 
Jn order to demonstrate which variables should affect the sharing rule, we trace the 
process of decision making backward. First, we consider the decision making at the 
second stage. Each member decides on his/her private consumption through 
maximizing the sub-utility of private consumption, u\ given the private expenditure 
share, X ' . Formally, it is written as: 
Mqpz4=i4(q,;z;) 
s.t. p ' q ' = X . (P1) 
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It follows that the private consumption of member i is a function of X', z^  and p. 
However, since we consider a fixed price model, p is ignored. Therefore, we have: 
q' = q' (JT, z\), or equivalently, 
c=c{r,z[). (4.14) 
The indirect sub-utility function would then be a fianction of X' and z\ :i� 
K=4r;z^). (4.15) 
Now, we refer back to the first stage. Taking into account the solution of the 
second stage, the family maximizes the household welfare, subject to the household 
budget constraint. L e t t i n g � a n d U' respectively denote the household welfare and 
the utility of i, it is formally written as: 
Max W = |LiU^+{l-|u)U^ 
x\x\Q 产 ^ ) 
s.t. X ^ + X ^ + F Q - / (P2) 
where “ is the weighting of member^'s utility in the household welfare function. 
ln order to study the sharing rule in structural form specified by BBCL, X is 
allowed to affect // so that we have //(X,z). We do not putXto affect the MRS's 
because there is not theoretical grounding for us to considerXas a factor affecting the 
preferences of individuals. If we take into account the assumption of caring 
preferences and separability between private and public goods in individuals' sub-
utility functions, the household welfare function can be written as: 
y = ^ z ) t / > 7 ) + ( l - / < X , z ) ) t / > ^ v $ 
v ' = V ^ u : { x ' ; z f ) y ^ { Q ; z t ) ) and v^=F^(<(x^;zf),z.^(Q;z,^)), 
10 Note that u' in (4.14) is different in meaning to that in (P1). Here it stands for the indirect sub-utility 
after maximization in the first stage while that in (P1) is direct sub-utility function. The practice of 
sharing notation in this way will be found in the remaining part ofthe thesis in purpose of saving 
notations. 
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where y!^  is defmed as above mentioned while i^ , ^' and U' denote respectively the 
sub-utility gained from consumption of public goods, sub-utility gained from own 
consumption and total utility of member i. 
Subject to the constraint: 
X ^ + X ^ + F Q = % ) , (4.16) 
the family maximizes JV by choosing the optimal combination of X^, X^ and Q. 
Since all the exogenous variables affect either the household welfare function or one 
of the budget constraints, in general, X^, X^ and Q depend on all the exogenous 
variables. Here we express the solutions in the most general forms: 
; r _ = r ( z f , z f , z 2 � z 2 � z ” z ) , a n d (4.17a) 
Q = Q(z/,zf,Z2^zf,ZpZ). (4.17b) 
Note that the first one ofthe above equations is the sharing rule expressed in reduced 
form. To see howXaffects the sharing rule, we consider the case thatXis given. Once 
Xis given, constraint (4.16) will split into two. They are respectively: 
X ^ + X ^ = X , a n d 
VQ = l{zj)-X. 
Our concem here is which exogenous variable(s) in the reduced form sharing rule 
will be dropped out when X is controlled. Generally speaking, all the exogenous 
variables may be retained because each one of them still affects the household welfare 
function or the second budget. However, under some specific conditions, introduction 
ofXinto the sharing rule will make some exogenous variable become insignificant. 
One example is introduced here. Consider the case that private goods and public 
goods are "strongly separable" in each member's sub-utility function and members' 
sub-utility functions are also "strongly separable" in each member's caring utility 
function, the household welfare function can be rewritten as: 
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� = ^ � � ( < ( Z ' ; z f ) , < ( Z � z f ) , # , z ) ) , � Q ( 4 Q ; Z 2 ” , < ( Q ; Z 2 ” , / < Z , z ) � 
(4.18) 
or equivalently, 
W = + q , � Q ) ’ 
%=�q(<(Z�zf ) ,<( ;^�zf)，/<^Z)) , 
and W^ = W^ [u^ (Q; z^ )^, < (Q; z',), ju{X, z)). 
In other words, private goods and public goods are also separable in household 
welfare function where W^  is independent of Q and ^Q is independent of 
X^ andX^ . Furthermore, we would fmd that the allocation between X^ andX^ is 
only bounded by X^ + X^ = X and the combination of Q is only bounded by 
P'Q = /(z^) 一 X . Therefore, the optimization becomes two separated ones. They are 
respectively: 
Max JVq = W^  (< {X' ； z,^  )，< {X' ； zf )，//(X, z)) 
JC ,x \ 
s.t. X ^ + X ^ = : X , (P3) 
a n d M a x W^ = W^ ( v ^ (Q； i \ ) , v^ ( Q ; A ) , 人乂 , z)^ 
s.t. P 'Q = / ( z , ) - X . (P4) 
Solving (P3) and (P4), it follows that: 
r = r ( x , z f , z f , z ) , (4.19a) 
Q = Q ( x , z ^ z f , z , , z ) . (4.19b) 
From the solution, we can observe that given X, the sharing rule in structural form 
depends only on z f , zf and x}^ Li other words, those variables affecting only the 
11 Note that we cannot say that the sharing rule in structural form is independent of z^，z^ and z, 
because elements in these vectors may also appear in zf，zf or z. 
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MRS's within the public goods or affecting only the household income should not 
affect the sharing rule onceXis controlled. 
The sub-optimal level of household welfare given a particular level of X is obtained 
by substituting (4.19a) and (4.19b) into (4.18). I fwe denote that sub-optimal level of 
household welfare by JV*, we have: 
�*=r(Z ;zf，zf ,Z2�zf ,Z”Z). 
The family will choose the level ofXto further optimize W*. Through setting: 
"�*(Z;zf ,zf，z2 ' ,zf ,z”z) 
V '- — 0. 
dX 
we can solve the optimal X as a function of all the exogenous variables. Here, denote 
the function by: 
X = X ,1 , Zj , Zj , Z2, Zj, z) • 
I fwe substitute this into (4.19a), it gives the sharing rule in reduced form derived in 
(4.17a). 
Ifwe substitute (4.17a) and (4.19a) into (4.14)，we obtain: 
C = C (zf, zf, Z2', 4，z,, z), and (4.20a) 
C = C ( x , z f , z f , z ) . (4.20b) 
These are respectively the consumption functions we have to estimate before the 
sharing rule in reduced or structural form is identified. Comparing (4.20a) to (4.20b), 
we can see that when we identify the share rule in reduced form instead of structural 
form, we may fmd that we have to include more exogenous variables in general 
speaking.i2 
12 It is also possible that some insignificant variables are excluded when we shift from structural form to 
reduced form under some rare situation. The condition for this to happen is: 
汲' dK�dK n ——= ^0 , 
dzQ dK dzQ 
which implies that: 
St' dK' dK' dK n = + = 0. 
dZg dz^ dX. dZe 
34 
For example, if it is the difference between member's wage rates instead of the 
wage rates themselves which affects the weighting ofindividual utilities in household 
welfare, then the wage rates will be among z^  but not z；, z^  or z. Similarly, subsidy a 
family receives from the government not designated to any gender should be among 
z^  but not z'i，4 or z. On the other hand, subsidy specific for purchase of housing 
(which is a public good) should be in i : but not Zj (by separability assumption), z, 
or z. Lti other words, these variables should be included in (4.20a) but not (4.20b). 
These are some of the possible examples of exogenous variables which appear in the 
consumption functions only whenXis not controlled. 
4.4 Test for Omission of Some Items in the Total Private Expenditure 
As we have shown in the previous subsection, we have to put more exogenous 
variables into the consumption functions when we identify the sharing in reduced 
form. If we have no problem with collecting these exogenous variables, a test can be 
set up to test for omission ofobservation of total private expenditure. 
Compared with the approach ofBBCL which has to adopt assumption vi in case of 
omission of items ofprivate consumption, this alternative approach is a more general 
method ofidentifying the net effect o f z on the sharing rule. Under the situation ofno 
omission of observation of private consumption or validity of assumption vi, both 
approaches provide sufficiently close estimates of the net effect of z on the sharing 
rule. 
In their approach, the net effect is directly implied from (2.5) and (3.7) as: 
^ 7 ^ [ 4 + f " ] , " 人 （4.21) 
^ e ^6 — Le V OZQ) 
where z^ is an element ofz and 4 = ^ l ^ = ^ j ^ , 戶 义 B and 0= 1,.". 
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Therefore, we can set up the null hypothesis that the net effects estimated from 
(4.13) equal that from (4.21) for all factors in z. Ifthis hypothesis is rejected, then it 
can be concluded that there is omission of some expenditure on private goods which 
are not separable from the observable private goods. The result of the test let us know 
that we are entitled to recover the partials ofthe sharing function conditioned on the 
total private expenditure applying the approach of BBCL when there is no data 
problem (i.e. when the test is not rejected). However, if there is data problem (i.e. 
when the test is rejected), we are minded to be more careful in applying the method of 
BBCL. 
Note that the test relies on the comprehensive observation of exogenous variable. 
Therefore, i fwe are not sure that we have all the relevant exogenous variables, the test 
becomes a joint test of omission of observation of total private expenditure or 
omission ofobservation of exogenous variables. 
4.5 Designation ofNature of Goods~A Remark 
In the discussion above, it is implicitly assumed as in convention that we can 
unambiguously designate a good to be private or public (BBCL 1994) while uncertain 
ofthe coverage ofprivate expenditure. Here, we consider another situation that we are 
certain that the survey is comprehensive enough to cover all the consumption items. 
However, there is one good we have no prior knowledge of its nature. It can be shown 
that the test developed in the previous subsection can be used to designate the nature 
ofthat good then. 
First consider the case that the good is private in nature. If we appropriately include 
the good as one ofthe private goods, it would be found that applying the approach in 
either BBCL (4.21) or this thesis (4.13) provides sufficiently close estimates ofthe net 
effects on the sharing rule. However, if we mistakenly exclude the good from the total 
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private expenditure, equality between 茨‘/茂没(from 4.13) and 5x'|dz^ (from 4.21) 
would break down. Then, consider the case that the good is public in nature. In this 
case, only correctly excluding the good from total private expenditure can ensure that 
equality between 3c ' /^^ and 5x'|dzQ holds. Based on this idea, the method of 
designating the nature of a good is thus developed. 
If we are uncertain of the nature of more than one good, we have to try all different 
combination of inclusion of private goods. Since, only the appropriate combination 
ensures that equality (4.19) holds, the method of designation also applies. However, it 
is still doubted the power ofthis test since the consequences of mistaken inclusion of 
public good into the total private expenditure is not yet derived due to complexity. 
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5. Extension to Include Private Leisure as a Choice Variable of Individuals 
Lti section 2, we have reviewed how BBCL identify the sharing rule in a framework 
of fixed labor where every member in a family works full-time. Here in this section, 
their firamework is extended to include leisure as one of the choice variables of 
individuals. 
5.1 Difficulties in Identification of Sharing Rule ofTotal Private Expenditure in a 
Framework ofFree Labor Choice 
Although BBCL consider a framework of fixed labor, leisure is one of the choice 
variable when Chiappori (1988b, 1992) initiated the sharing rule interpretation of 
household behaviors. By assuming that: 
vii) leisure is purely private, 
Chiappori (1992) shows that the sole observation oflabor supply is enough to identify 
the sharing rule up to an additive constant. 
There are two difficulties in recovering the sharing rule in a framework of free 
labor/leisure choice. The first one is the recovery of the effect of wage rate on the 
sharing rule. Applying the method of BBCL and Chiappori, only the effects of those 
variables affecting demands solelythrough changing each members expenditure share. 
As we know, the wage rate is the opportunity cost of leisure. This implies that, given 
the expenditure share allocated to him/her, the wage rate of individual i still imposes a 
pure substitution effect on the demand ofmember i for a private good,/: 
^ = 星 化 + ^ (5.1) 
^, dK'彻，^, xi ‘ 
;r_=x'+w,7VS i = A,B, 
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where x' denotes the expenditure ofmember i on goods and services excluding leisure， 
iV' denotes the leisure of member i, andX denotes the total private expenditure share 
allocated to member i in a framework offree labor/leisure choice. We can see that the 
second term prevents us from applying the method ofBBCL when wage rates are the 
only factors affecting the sharing rule. 
This difficulty is already solved (under assumption vii) by Chiappori (1992) 
through making use ofthe argument that the change in a member's wage rate does not 
impose a substitution effect on the private consumption ofthe spouse: 
< ^ / ^) ^' . j /c o\ 
~~J-二"~J— , 1丰1. P . A ) 
d^^ dK' d^^ 
From (5.2), we have: 
—dC) ldw, 二 ^ 7 ^ . (5 3) 
‘dC)丨汲 d K ' j ^ . 
Again Jl is estimable by 尤」，where a denotes, as in previous sections, the 
^ ， ^ SCj^ 
assignable good. As we know, dK'jdK is identifiable when there exists at least one 
more factor other than wage rates which affects the sharing rule. If we further apply 
(5.3), the effect of member t,s wage rate on member f s expenditure shared is 
identified as: 
[ : I 1 [ , (5.4) 
� t dK 
and the effect on his/her own expenditure share is: 
^ _ ^ _ ^ ^ ^ _ j i ^ (5.5) 
d^^ dw^ d^, d^i I 汲 
for i * i. 
The above difficulty and solution to it is reviewed here because the method will be 
applied in the next subsection when we consider a more general situation where 
assumption vii is relaxed. 
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The other difficulty is that if we relax the assumption adopted by Chiappori that 
leisure is purely private, the total private expenditure would be unobservable. This is 
because total private expenditure contains consumption on private leisure. However, 
observation of individual labor supplies does not tell us how much ofthe (observable) 
total leisure of a member is spent alone (i.e. privately) and how much is spent with the 
spouse (i.e. publicly). Let Nl and Ng respectively denote the private and public 
leisure ofmember i. Although the total leisure consumed by individual i: 
AT =7V;+7V^, i = A, B (5.6) 
is observable (since that would equal time endowment minus labor supply), neither is 
N\ nor Ng. Therefore, the total private expenditure: 
X ^ [ w , N t ^ x ' ) ^ [ w , N ^ ^ x ' ) (5.7) 
would also be unobservable. As we have mentioned in the previous section, under the 
situation that total private expenditure is not comprehensively covered, the best we 
can do is identifying the net effect of z on the sharing function of the observed subset 
ofprivate expenditure. It means that the sharing rule ofthe total private expenditure is 
not recoverable in a framework of free labor choice where private expenditure should 
include each member's consumption on private leisure, (w,7V;) which is not 
observable even at household level. 
In the next subsection, assumption vii will be relaxed so that individual leisure is 
allowed to be partly private and partly public. We develop a method of identifying the 
net effect of z on unobservable private leisure of individuals and the sharing rule in 
the framework of free labor/leisure choice without observing the total private 
expenditure. 
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5.2 Identification of Sharing Rule of Total Private Expenditure Without 
Observation ofPrivate Leisure 
As mentioned earlier, although N' (=7Vg + iV )^ is observable because it equals the 
time endowment minus the time oflabor supplied, neither is Ng nor N^ • Therefore, 
the total private expenditure (refer to (5.7)) is also unobservable and thus we cannot 
apply the method of BBCL which requires the observation of total private 
expenditure. In this subsection, we will develop a method of estimating the net effects 
ofvariables in z on the unobservable private leisure of each member. Further more, it 
will be proved that if leisure is the only omission of private expenditure, the net 
effects of z on the sharing rule of total private expenditure are still identifiable in a 
framework of free labor/leisure choice where total private expenditure is 
unobservable. The necessary assumptions required here is basically the same as in 
convention except that assumption v is adopted with some modification: 
v') Expenditure on all private goods and services except private leisure is 
observable. 
PROPOSITION 2: Under assumpt ions i-iv and 
尤”先本 ^ ] J ^ ' for at least a pair ofz's, 
纪：丨〜^H^H 
in a framework offree labor/leisure choice where pure private leisure of each member 
is not observable, the effects of z on the private leisure is still identifiable. 
Furthermore, if private leisure is the only component omitted from observation of 
private expenditure, i.e. under assumption v', the net effects of z on the sharing mle of 
total private expenditure is also identifiable. 
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Proof: 
Since the public leisure which represents the time a couple spend together is a 
component in common for both members' leisure, i.e. Ng - 7Vg，by (5.6), we have: 
A ^ = N ^ - N ^ = N ^ - N ' (5.8) 
where A^ denotes the difference in total or private leisure between members. 
Furthermore, this difference is equal to the observable difference in labor supply 
because: 
A^ :NA—NB 
= [T-L^)-{T-L') = L'-L\ 
In other words, although the total of private leisure is not observable, the difference of 
private leisure can be observed because it equals the negative difference of labor 
supply. 
We proceed to the identification of net effect of z on each member's private 
leisure. Since only the net effect of z is concerned here, the leisure functions are 
rewritten in reduced forms. Consider the net effects oftwo components (z^  and Zk) in z 
on the difference in private leisure: 
^ . ^ _ ^ (5.9a) 
^h ^h ^h 
^二塑一冗 
^k ^k ^k , 
or by (4.8), 
^ _ ^ . ^ _ L ^ ^ (5.%) 
dZk _ Lk,h & � ‘ & • ( ^ 
From (5.9a) and (5.9b), it can be solved that: 
u ^ 
^A ^k,h ^ ^ 
— - j f \ i A . (5.10a) 
^h ^k,h 一 ^k,h 
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� L^ ^IL_^JL 
^ _ ^ i ^ _ _ ^ (5.10b) 
/9z _ rB _ T^ ‘ ^h ^k,h 一 ^k,h 
m^ ^A 
^ = < , ^ , a n d (5.10c) 
^k ^h 
/W^ ^B 
i = L l A . (5.10d) 
茂， ，dZh 
Therefore, the net effects ofz^ and Zk on the unobservable private leisure of each 
member are identified. Recall that it is already proved in the previous section that the 
net effects of Zh and Zk on the expenditure on private goods and services are 
identifiable. Since adding up the net effects on member /，s private leisure and 
consumption of all private goods gives the net effect on the /'s private expenditure 
share, the net effect on the sharing rule of total private expenditure are identified as: 
LB ^JL_^N_ 
^ ^ ^ . w , ？ , ， (5.11a) 
^h ^h h,h — H,h 
劣"—劣" 
敌 " ^ ' ‘‘ ^ . — ^ . .5 11b^ 
二 ~ ^ ^ + 州万 7§ —A , ( ) . l l D J 
^h ^h ^k,h — Lk,h 
‘ jB ^A^ dl^ 
f ^ 4 + w A 、 ） 广 ， " d (5.11c) 
c^k ^k ^k,h — H,h 
jA ^N__^N_ 
^ - ^ ^ ^ X . V " / ' (5.11d) 
C^k ^k ^k,h — Hji 
where WA and WB are respectively the wage rates of member A and B and x' denotes 
the expenditure share allocated to member i for consumption on goods and services. 
Since ^ ' / ^ 0 is identifiable (refer to section 4), the net effect of z on the sharing rule 
oftotal private expenditure is also identified. Q.E.D. 
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An interesting point about this result is that the net effect on a member's 
expenditure share is a function of his/her wage rate. We have such a result because 
what we observe is the difference in leisure time instead ofdifference in consumption 
on leisure, w^N^ - w i^V^ • If it is the latter case, the identified partials in (5.10a-d) 
are the net effects on each member's consumption of private leisure instead of hours 
of private leisure. It follows that we do not have to multiply these partials by wage 
rates before we put them into (5.11a-d) to identify the net effects on the sharing rule. 
Li other words, wage rates would not appear in equation (5.11a-d). 
To identify the effects of wage rates, we make use of the property that the wage 
rate of a member imposes no substitution effect on the consumption function of the 
spouse (in reduced form here): 
工 二 竺 义 /". (5.12) 
彻， 3K' dw^ 
Under (5.12), we have: 
勢 二 勢 … , (5.13) 
t,k ^ ; M 况/疼 
where ^ ' | ^ j , is already proved to be identifiable. 
i 
The immediate implication of(5.13) is: 
^ n ^ Ji ‘ . (5.14) 
dw^ i, dz^ 
It follows that the effect of a member's own wage rate on his/her consumption on a 
non-assignable good is identifiable as: 
盈 二 左 _ 4 岸 . (5.15) 
dw^ dw^ ‘，dz^  
Then，we proceed to identify the effects of wage rates on individuals' private 
leisure. Since (5.14) also applies to demand for private leisure, we have: 
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f ^ = 4 . ^ , i & (5.16) • ‘ &k 
After further making use of the reduced form of (5.8): 
A = f}A _ f^B ^N � � ‘ 
the effects ofmembers' own wage rates on individual private leisure are identified as: 
i ^ A a n d (5.17a) 
dv^ dv^ d^^ 
H & (5.17b) 
dw^ dw^ ^ 5 
This in tum implies that the effects on the sharing rule are also identifiable because 
adding up the effects on a member's private consumption of all goods and the private 
leisure gives the effect on his/her expenditure share for private consumption. 
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time in the literature the sharing rule is 
identified in a framework of free labor/leisure choice where individual leisure is 
allowed to be partly public in nature, although we have only identify the net effect 
instead of the partials with X controlled. Besides, there is another interesting 
application of the above findings. It is stated below. 
COROLLARY： Under assumptions i-iv, the net effects of z on the public leisure 
of a couple is identifiable. 
Since the total leisure of each member is observable, the effect of z on each 
r - - j . 
o?i r, 
member's total leisure,——is also estimable. Then, the net effect of z (including 
di 
wage rates) on the public leisure is identified as: 
m , i=AorB. (5.18) 




where >^'- is identifiable by (5.10a-d), (5.16) and (5.17a-b). 
dL 
Therefore, the observation of each member, labor supply is adequate for us to 
identify what factors draw a couple to spend more time together. If amount of leisure 
couples spending together is an indication of intimacy between couples and strength 
ofthe family tie, and we further believe that pulling a couple nearer and strengthening 
the family tie enhance stability of marriage, this result would then be useful for the 
analysis of divorce. An immediate implication follows that government can use 
variables in z to encourage couples to spend more leisure time together and improve 
the stability of marriage and thus reduce divorce rates. 
5.3 Identification of Sharing Rule in Structural Form with the Observation of 
Unearned Licomes 
The method of identification of sharing rule in a framework of firee labor/leisure 
developed in this thesis is more general than the conventional method in the way that 
assumption vii is relaxed. However, only the net effects o f z are identified while the 
partials ofthe sharing rule in structural forms: 
r=r(X,z), i=A,B, (5.19) 
is not. ]n this subsection, it will be shown that in cases that unearned income of each 
member is reported in a survey, it is also possible to identify the sharing rule written 
in structural form up to an additive constant without the observation ofX^purely due 
to the unobservability of private leisure). All we need is a very intuitive assumption, 
namely, 
viii)Conditioned on X, it is the full incomes of members which affect the sharing 
ofATwhile the composition offull incomes does not matter. 
The assumption is based on the idea that the full income of a member instead ofthe 
composition of the full income reflects the member's wealth, option outside the 
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marriage and contribution to the family which in retum give him/her bargaining 
power. Li other words, only the full incomes of members affect the fractions, p and (1_ 
p), of total private expenditure allocated to each member, while variables affecting the 
composition of full incomes plays no role (although we allow the composition to 
affect total private expenditure, X). Under assumption viii, the sharing rule is rewritten 
as: 
x^ = pX; X'^{l-p)X, 
jr = z(w�wVoVo〜....)， 
ya = p(z,/\/〜....)，and 
7'-wT+/j, i=A,B, 
where 1^ and / ' respectively denote the unearned and full income of member i while 
rdenotes each member's time endowment. 
PR0P0SITI0N3: Under assumption viii, and assumptions in proposition 2, the 
sharing rule in structural form as specified in (5.19) in a framework of free 
labor/leisure where leisure is allowed to be partly public in nature, is identifiable up to 
an additive constant. 
Proof. 
First, consider identities: 
色 仏 化 1 , - (5.20) 
dw^ ^B 汲 ^B 
^ _ ^ + ^ _ ^ (5.21) 
dll — dll 汲 dll • 
Ifwe multiply (5.21) by , a n d deduct it from (5.20), we have: 
^ _ T ^ = ^ - r - + - f - - r -
^ ' 更 - 石 ― ^ ^ l ^ . ^iV ‘ 
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Under assumption viii, given X, the effect (on the sharing rule) of change in w^ on ^ 
^A ^A 
is T times that of change in ” . ]n other words, T ~ ~ ^ 二 0 and it follows that 
^B ^0 
the above equation should become: 
^^ j x ^^ f ^ ^ ^ ) 
r———= T " ^ - ，or 
d^Q dI^ dK \dv^ dI^) 
dK^ _f dK ^ y Y S t ^ T^^\ (5 22) 
汲 \dw^ dl^J \dw^ dI^) 
汲 
Note that — actually refers to the net effects of z onZso that it can be estimated by: 
I ^^ ^B 
— = + • (5.23) 
dt dL dL 
Substituting (5.23) into (5.22) allows us to identify the partial of the sharing rule in 
structural form as: 
^ . f ^ + ^ _ ^ _ ^ V T - - r - l (5.23a) 
^ " l ^ ^ ^ " ^Io ^oJ V ^ 5 ^oJ' • 
By symmetry, we have: 
^ 二 f f + ^ _ ^ —旬—1 ( ^ _ T ^ • (5.23b) 
~ ^ ~ [ ~ ^ ^ ^ ~ ^Io ^Io) V^^ ^t J ‘ . 
Making use ofthe identity: 
! = g + < | , _A,B, (5.24) 
dL dL dK dL 
汲1 
we proceed to identify ——of the sharing rule in the structural form. After 
dh 
substituting (5.23) into (5.24) and some manipulation, the partial is identified as: 
义 = 色 对 仏 ^ , i=A,B. (5.25) 
dL dL dK \ dL dL ) 
Q.D,E. 
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6. Possibility of Identifying the Sharing Rule of Total Private Expenditure 
under Incomplete Observation of Consumption of Commodities 
][n section 4, a method of identifying the net effect of z on the sharing function is 
developed. This method relaxes the assumption of separability between observable 
and unobservable private goods in individuals' sub-utility functions in case of 
omission of items of total private expenditure. However, what has been recovered is 
still restricted to be only a sharing function which describes the allocation of the 
observed private expenditure. This limitation applies to the approach of BBCL as 
well. Jn section V, it is proved that if private leisure is the only item of private 
expenditure unobserved, the net effect of z on the sharing rule is still identifiable. In 
this section, we will discuss to what extent we can identify the sharing rule ofthe total 
private expenditure when the incompleteness in observation of private expenditure is 
more than the omission of private leisure. 
Consider applying the approach developed in section 4 to recover the partial ofthe 
reduced form ofthe sharing flmction of total private expenditure, SC'jdzQ . It requires 
the estimation of partials of all non-assignable private goods. That is impossible if 
some item(s) of private consumption other than private leisure is(are) omitted in a 
survey. Referring to the approach proposed by BBCL, the possibility ofidentifying the 
sharing rule of total private expenditure is also effaced since it requires the 
observation oftotal private expenditure. Realizing this impossibility, we shift to study 
the sharing written as pO). It is found that under certain conditions, the reduced form 
of fiX, z) is identified up to a constant even omission of items in X is more than 
unobservability of private leisure. 
Ifthe observed private expenditure (x) is not equal to the total private expenditure 
⑷，BBCL's specification, ><7=p(x, z), is only a sharing rule for the observable subset 
of private expenditure. This can be recognized from the expressions x^=xp and 
49 
xB=x(l-p) which reflect that this sharing function is used to determine how much of 
the observed subset of private expenditure is allocated to agent A and how much to 
agent B. For this sharing function to be extendible to explain the allocation of total 
private expenditure, it should be further assumed that the unobservable private 
expenditure is allocated according to the same sharing function, p(-). It means that: 
X: = p{x,z)x^, and (6.1a) 
x^={l-p{x,z))x^, (6.1b) 
where Xu , x^ and xf respectively represent the household expenditure on unobserved 
private goods, A's and B's expenditure shares for consumption on the unobservable 
private goods. However, it is quite strong to assume that the sharing function within 
the observed private expenditure (p) also applies to the unobserved subset. 
In the remainder of this section, we fmd a situation under which the sharing 
function, ^ = yt^Z(z,i),z) inthe reducedform: 
P = H^,i), (6-2) 
can be identified up to a constant. 
6.1 Identification of p{-) 
Let Zk and Zh be two of the parameters in z which are not among the taste 
parameters or in the price vector. From (4.8), it follows that: 
【 ： ‘ ^ (6-3) 
^k ‘ ^h 
n-^ . / r ^ . / 
where 4^力 is estimated through combining the partials y ^ Q � a n d ^y^^^ 
collected from the individual consumption functions ofthe assignable private good. 
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Let "tilde" denote the reduced form ofafunction as before. Consider the net effects of 
( z , , z , ) o n ( Z M ^ ) : 
【 + 【 = 竺 (6.4a) 
&, dz, dz, 
and 
dX^ I dX^ — dX 
&i dz, dz,, 
or using (6.3)， 
丄么仏 4 化 =这 . （6.4b) 
&A dz, dz, 
Solving (6.4a) and (6.4b)，it can be obtained that: 
/"•««_/ r - ^ 
dK LB 汲 
^ _ K _ ! l I K (6.5) 
;> — rB — jA 
0Zh H,h 一 ^ k,h 
Since only some components of private expenditure in a family is observed, the 
partial derivatives presented in (6.5) are not estimable. Fortunately, this impossibility 
does not necessarily apply to the identification of the sharing rule of the total private 
expenditure written as，并）.It will be shown below that if we wish to identify 并)，it 
r ^ 
St , . dc[sX j j 
is not necessary to estimate ——.tistead, we need to estimate - ^ and under some 
dlQ OlQ 
situations, this partial is estimable. 
Given T^ 二 pX, consider differentiating X^ with respect to Zh: 
^ ' ' 〜 S t ~ Sp 
二 P h A . 
^h ^ ^^h 
After substituting this into (6.5)，we have: 
^^B _ ^ 
� d x ^ ^p ^ o ^k 
厂^~+2^~二 ~~rS H"~ . 
dZf^ 0Zh "力一、力 
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Rearranging, we have: 
‘ 敌 L B 敌 � 
3p 1 ¾ " k ’ � ~ ^ J 敌 � 
—= \ . ^~~p,OT 
A Ll,-Li, Xdz: 
^ = R , i Z f , M _ M l _ M ; s (6.6a) 
取 ’ V , dz^ dzj^ J dZh 
where 及众,；^二(^ 力^_^ 力^). 
By symmetry, the partial with respect to Zk can be written as: 
/ r->j r ^ \ r>^ 
3p B <^nX dnX] dnX^ 
~Z~ “ ^h,k ^h,k ~Z ^ ^ P &, 、 dZk dz, ； dZk 
\ - i 
where R^^, = [Ll, - Ll^ j • 
After rearranging terms, it can be rewritten as 
i _ R lA [jB M _ M l _ ^ p (6.6b) 
3 ( R � h � h [ L k ’ � , , J 取 々 
where 八力={lfj^  — 0力)• 
Let that: 
. ( ^ \ - R { i ' ^ - ^ 1 13 (6.7a) 
;kM-J<k,[h’h^h a z J ' � 
( “ z ) = ¥ , a n d (6.7b) 
取 
U z ) = M . (6.7c) 
13 Here, ^^^(-) is a function ofboth z and z. However, z is hidden for convenience ofpresentation. 
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It follows that (6.6a) and (6.6b) can then be rewritten as: 
^ = ^ , , { z ) - C , m z ) . (6.8a) 
^h 
学 = 仏 於 ( “ 稱 （6.8b) 
^k 
Up to here, all the partials are expressed as a function of p , estimable terms and 
the partial derivatives of (log) total private expenditure. Therefore, whether the 
sharing function is identifiable depends on whether the partials of (log) total private 
expenditure function is estimable when we can only observe a subset of expenditure 
on private goods. Muitively, when a random subset of X, namely x is increased by 
1%, it would be expected that X is also increased by 1% on average if there is no 
further information. Ofcourse this is a very loose idea, but it tells us that there is some 
r ^ 
^¾]!^^ 
light ofestimating the partials - ^ ~ when we only observe x，which is a subset o f X 
^¾!^¾^ 
In this section, we introduce a condition under which — ~ can be estimated by 
oz 
^ . We emphasize that this is only a sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
identification. The construction of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
identification will be left for future research. The assumption is: 
ix) The probability for a private good to be observed is independent of the 
expenditure on the good or the rate of percentage change of consumption 
with respect to z's (^\nC/^). 
^¾^<*^^ 
PROPOSITION 4: Assumption ix is a sufficient condition for the partials - ^ - to 
“ C7L 
be estimable. It further implies that both the sharing function in reduced form,并） 
and the partials ofit can be identified up to a constant. 
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Proof: 
Let the probability for each good to be observed be y/which is unknown and 
define s ' = ^ . (6.9) 
^e 
/ �� 
Q 1 ^dinK 
It follow immediately that s can be rewritten as - ^ y/X , or 
y/X\ ozQ 乂 
? = h & ) , (6.10) ^ 
r ^ � ~ f\wX 
where g = y/X and X^ 二 y/X^~~ 
^e 
The estimation of s^ is a two-step procedure. In the first step, it is constructed an 
estimator for Xe, namely: 
l e - t < ^ (6.11) 
;=i 
f r ^ �dnC. � 1 . 
, 0 c ―’ if C, is observed, 
where u. =<^  ] 么 ] 
J 6 
0, otherwise, 
where Cj denotes the household expenditure on a private good and N is the total 
number of private goods. 
The unbiasedness ofthis estimator for 2^is demonstrated as follows: 
(N \ -
EUe]-E 2 X 
V j=l 乂 
- i 4 ; ) 
7=1 
= s k ^ + ( i - _ 
Ml ^0 � 
� A C,. dnCj ~ e , 二 ^ ^ 1 [ ^ ^ 7 ^二 _ 义〜 
M X diQ 
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The next step is to construct an estimator for <;. 
N 
Define x = ^ X , (6.12) 
y=i 
‘ r - - i r ^ 
1 C,，if C, is observed, 
where v . 二 < 」 J • 
[0, otherwise. 
It follows that 
^ = i K + ( i i ) ( o ) ) 
M 
= y/X. 
Hence the estimator for s^ is given by: 
1 N ^Q 上 v^ e 
£ =_2^"y ,or 
X j=i 
g 0 = _ ^ . (6.13) 
^e 
Therefore, the rate of percentage change of the subset of observed private 
expenditure with respect to z can serve as an estimator for the rate of percentage 
change ofthe total private expenditure with respect to z under assumption ix. 
After replacing dx)X|^^ and dix^|^j^ in (6.6) by a m | & ^ and aroc|&j^，兴）is 
recoverable up to only a constant being unidentified (refer to appendix): 
p(z) = - ( c ,+F ( z )+ \ ^ , , (z)exp( jC, (z)dz, )jz, )exp( jc, (z)dz,) (6.14) 
, � f . ^lnX ^lnT 
where ^ . . W = ^ [ 4 . ^ ^ J ' 
, � d l n X 
“ z h j , 
c h is a constant, and 
H(z) is a function whose functional form would become explicit when the 
functional forms ofthe partials o f p are specified. Q.E.D. 
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We can see that ^- ) is identified up to a constant. Since its partials are functions 
of 汉.)itself, the partials are also identified up to a constant. If we are in desire to 
specify the unspecified constant in p(-) and in its derivatives, we have to adopt the 
technique used in BBCL which sets the share for each member to be one-half at the 
mean ofthe data. 
Note that this method of estimating the net effect of z on each member's share, 
p(-) is applicable for the situation that there is no omission of items in total private 
expenditure. Even more, it is not necessary to adopt assumption ix then. We can see 
that without specifying the share at the mean of population, the net effect is only 
identified as a function of p{-) itself. Therefore, the net effect of z on p(-) is also 
identified up to a constant. Li other words, without specifying the share at the mean of 
the population, the net effect of z on 兴) i s not identified (but the net effect on X is 
identifiable). LettingXinstead ofx denote the total private expenditure, recall (4.21) 
which follows immediatelythe results ofBBCL: 
欲'一 Ll ( , 1 汲、. 
^k ^k-^t V k dzJ 
Substituting the L.H.S of the equation by 
双乂 汉^ ^ 5p 
= P ^ ^ - ^ , 
&^k ^k ^k 
we can obtain this result: 
» - Lt i L j - ^ - ^ p . (6.15) 
dz,-x[Ll-Li)V ^ J 先 
It can be observed that (6.15) which is derived from BBCL's result is identical in 
functional form to (6.6b) in our approach. Therefore, the result obtained applying our 
approach is consistent with that ofBBCL. 
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7. Parametric Examples for Illustration 
Li sections 5 and 6, a general discussion on identification was carried out. It is 
useful to implement the method ofidentification on some specific algebraic examples 
so that the methods and procedure of identification can be verified and better 
understood. Two examples are introduced below. The first one is for illustration ofthe 
identification of sharing rule in a framework of free labor choice developed in section 
5. The other one is for illustration ofthe identification of sharing rule oftotal private 
expenditure when omission of observation is more than private leisure developed in 
section 6. 
7.1 Example I 
Consider a case that there are exactly four factors affecting the sharing rule. They 
are respectively, Zh, Zk, w ,^ and w^. There are four private goods including each 
member's private leisure and two private commodities. One ofthe commodities is 
assignable and the other non-assignable. Suppose that the reduced forms ofindividual, 
household consumption and difference in members' leisure are all linear in these 
factors. If exogenous variables other than those in the sharing rule are hidden, 
observed individual consumption of the assignable good can be written as: 
df = c^o+^k^^ + a^z^ + a^w^ + a^w^ + • • • •, and (7.1a) 
Cf 二 A) + P#h + (^kZk + PA^" + PB^" +... • • (7.1b) 
The observed household consumption of the non-assignable good is written as: 
Q 二 ro + Yhh + Ykh + r X + r X + •. •.， (7.2) 
and the observed difference in members' leisure is written as: 
A^ 二 ^0 + ShZh + S,z, + S ,w ' + c ,^w^ +... •, (7.3) 
57 
It follows immediately that: 
LU=aJa,, Ll,h:Pk|Pu (7.4a) 
L'B,k =〜/仅,，L% = p j p , , and (7.4b) 
R , , = ~ ~ ^ ^ • (7.4c) 
‘ o c ^ p , - a , p ^ 
First, based on (4.12a-d), the effects ofz/, and Zk on the non-assignable goods are 
identified as: 
^n —aMn-PkYk) 
^h s , 
^n _Ph{cc,Y,-a,r,) 
^h ^ ， 
々 _ aJ^PkYk -PkYk) and 
^k s , 
^n -fiXajJk-OCjJh) 
~ ^ 二 ^ ‘ 
where5'-a;,y^^ -cCkPh. 
Next, we proceed to identifying the net effect ofzh and Zk on each member's private 
leisure. Based on (5.10a-d), it can be obtained that: 
St_a,{P,S,-p,5,)^ 
^h s 
^ ; _ y g > A - � A ) 
^ " ^ ‘ 
^:_a,{P,S,-/5,S,)^ ^ d 
^k ^ 
^^P,{a,5,-a,5,) 
^ " ^ • 
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Then, the net effect ofz" and Zk on the sharing mle can be summarized by adding 
up their effects on assignable, non-assignable consumption and private leisure of each 
member. Substituting the above partials into (5.11a-d), the effects ofz's on the sharing 
rule are identified to be linear in members' wage rates: 
^A . cx,{P,rH-PHYk) . A^AM^zMA r 7 w 
"^ = ^ + —s +w —s , ( ) 
凌召 二8 I fih{^h7k-^krh) I ^ .^g Ph{cc,S^-a^5,) 
茂,-Ph s s ， . 
^ = 0Ck + ^ A P . r . - P . r . ) + ^ . a A M . - M . ) , and (7.5c) 
&k s s 
^ B I PMhYk-^kYk) 1 ^^ .g PMk^h-o^h^k) (75d) 
~ ^ _ ^ S . . 
Although effects ofwage rates cannot be directly identified, when the effects ofz 's 
are identified, the results can be applied to identified the effect of wage rates. Making 
use of (5.14) and (5.15), the effects of wage rates on individual consumption ofthe 
non-assignable good are identified as: 
^n O^B[PkYh-Phrk) 
"^= —s , 
^ f _ A “ h - % n ) • = ^ ‘ 
^ f aAPjJh-PhYk) . 
~~— = 7„ — , a n d 
^ s h S 
於 A ( ^ - & r J 
• 二7广 —s • 
Similarly, using (5.16)，(5.17a) and (5.17b), the effects of wage rates on individual 
private leisure are identified as: 
^ ' _ ^ . ( y g A - y g A ) 
• — —S , 
59 
^ ; ^ y g . M . - ^ A ) 
^^ — S , 
^ t y g . M . - ^ A ) . . . 
——T 二 —— + 5 , , and 
^^ S ^ 
^“ _^AMnzMA ^ 
F _S � • 
Through adding up the effects on all private goods, the net effects of wage rates of 
individuals on the sharing rule are identified as: 
敌丑 PA{(^hYk-(^kYh) . ‘ B > ^ ^ � - � A ) .7 .^^ 
矿", —S + 狄 —S ， （7.6a) 
^^ o^B{PkYh-Phrk)^ ^ M M i z M i l (1 ^M 
矿 , 一 _ _ _ _ ^ + " —S , ( 7 . 6 b ) 
|； = “,,厂"“了"") + 〜 严 〜 - 缺 ) + 4 (7.6c) 
~ *"^ 
, d ^ B cc,{p,y,-p,y,) , [ a j M _ M ) 1 
and ^ - A + r ^ - — ~ " ^ + ^  ^ - ¾ . (7.6d) 
— 
Here, the partials are also linear in wage rates of individuals. From all the 
recovered partials ofthe sharing rule, it can be concluded that the sharing rule is linear 
in Zh, Zk, w^, w^, ZhW ,^ ZhW ,^ ZkW ,^ ZkW ,^ w / , w / , and w V . 
Now, we proceed to identify the net effects of Zh, Zk, v/，and w^ on the public 
leisure ofacouple. For illustration, suppose (7.3) is derived from: 
N ' = 71: + i%�h + " /z , + i i iw' + 77> ' +.. • •, (7.7a) 
N' 二 77o' + ^ ^ . + " X + " > ' + ^ > ' +. . . . • (7-7b) 
where 5j = rjf — " / • 




^H 一 S , 
^Qjrt-aXPA-PA) 
^k S ， 
^Q s”t-cxB�PA-PA) ^ 
^ = —S ，and 
^Q_Sil-p,{aA-(^A) 
^^ 一 s . 
Here, the identification of the structural form is not demonstrated through this 
example. However, if we can take Zh and Zk respectively to be the unearned incomes of 
members, 1^ and I^, and substitute (7.5a-d) and (7.6a-d) into (5.20a-b), the partials 
of each member's expenditure share with respect to X can be identified. Further 
making use of (5.20)，other partials of the sharing rule in the structural form can be 
identified as well. 
7.2 Example n 
The following example is for the purpose of demonstrating the process of 
identification of the sharing rule of total private expenditure under incomplete 
observation of expenditure on private goods. Specifying 兴) i n a very general form 
will impose complicated restrictions on the functional form of the consumption 
functions and the (log) expenditure function. These restrictions come from the 
differentiability condition, 
m ^ m . (7.8) 
^h^k ^k^h 
If the restriction are too complicated, the estimation can become very difficult. 
Therefore, the functional form used in this section will be a very simplified one which 
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ensures feasibility at this early stage of study. The conditions which guarantee the 
sharing function to be bounded within the range between (0,1) are not taken care of. 
This simplified version of 汉.)can be considered as an approximation of the true 
functional form which originally bounded between (0, 1). This simplified version will 
still estimate well ifthe share at the mean ofpopulation is moderate in value which is 
neither near zero nor one and data used is not far deviating from the population mean. 
Before specifying the functional form, in order to help presenting the process of 
identification, some results derived in the previous section are recalled: 
® = ^ , , (z ) -C, (zKz) ,and (7.9a) 
^h 
ffi = ^ , ( z ) - ^ , ( z K z ) . (7.9b) ^ 
- U z ) = 4 < - f ^ ) ， 
B ^ \ - l 
R]k,h - y^k,h 一 ^k,h), 
r ^ 
^ / X MC . 
C , ( z ) - , a n d 
( � d ^ 
“ ( z ) = " ^ . 
Consider a special case that the functional form ofthe sharing function is: 
�p{�,Zk~) = g^e—”3, (7.10) 
where gfs are constants. 
The functional form is specified as very simple for feasibility of identification at this 
early stage ofstudy. Under this specification, the partial derivatives will be 
• f " = ^ e — 
^k 





There are few restrictions imposed by this specification of the sharing function on 
the (log) expenditure function and the individual consumption functions. These 
restrictions are worth noting. First, after comparing terms between (7.8) and (7.9), we 
can see that the (log) expenditure should be a linear function ofz: 
r->^ 
C,{z) = ^ = <p,,^nd (7.12a) 
6¾ 
C,{z) = ^ = cp,. (7.12b) 
&, 
Besides, under this specification of the sharing function, the consumption fonctions 
should be set up in some functional forms which ensure that: 
4;^(z) = ^ i^3, and (7.12c) 
L U M = ^ 29^^ (7.12d) 
Here We choose to set up linear consumption functions. The equalities reflect that 
both 4;,(z) and Lf’h are constants. 
Finally, the differentiability condition should be checked. Li other words, (7.8) 
should be satisfied. Taking another degree of partial on (7.9a) and (7.9b), it follows 
that: 
f 5 W “ ^ “ ^ ， a n c i a . l 3 a ) 
^k^h 
| ^ =(农厂（为)). （7.13b) 
^h^k 
Therefore, in order to ensure that the sharing function is recoverable, the following 




咏“朱 =m n X / & , 
^ / /^, ^hiX/^,‘ 
After the discussion on the restrictions imposed on the consumption and (log) 
expenditure functions is carried out, a summary on the procedure of identification of 
汉.)can be drawn as follows: 
Step !:-Estimation of the coefficients of the consumption functions and the (log) 
income function based on restriction (7.14). 
Step 2: -Calculation of 灼，灼 and 仍 based on (7.12a-d). 
Step 3 -Substitution of 灼，灼 and 灼 into (7.10) to identify ^ - ) up to a constant (cpo) 
and into (7.11) to identify the partials up to a function of ^- ) itself. 
I fwe aim at recovering ^ - ) and its partials completely, we have to further impose a 




From the analytical work carried out in the previous sections, there are several 
findings we would like to summarize here. First, the findings of BBCL and BBCL* 
have been combined to assign the effects of EEPs and income variables (z) on 
individual consumption on any non-assignable private good. On the other hand, an 
alternative approach is proposed to assign these effects which is derived directly 
without the need to identify the partials of the sharing mle in advance. Through 
adding up the effects of z on the consumption of several goods, the effect of z on 
individual consumption on any (group of) private good(s) which is of the concem of 
this thesis can be recovered. If policy makers are in desire to subsidize or discourage 
the consumption ofone sex on a particular group of private goods, this result provides 
useM information on how much of the effect of a policy tool will be directed to each 
sex. 
Either in BBCL or BBCL*，it is assumed that total private expenditure can be 
observed and measured. However, it may not always be the case. Li case of 
incomplete observation of private consumption, we would aim at recovering the 
sharing function within the observed subset of private expenditure. If we apply the 
approach of BBCL for this purpose, it is shown that it entails the additional 
assumption that the observable and unobservable private goods are separable in the 
sub-utility functions of family members, ln this thesis, we develop an alternative 
method ofidentification. It has been proved that ifour concem is the net effect ofz on 
the sharing mle, this additional assumption can be relaxed when we apply this 
alternative approach. In addition, this thesis also suggest a test for the omission of 
items in total private expenditure. 
More interestingly, we have relaxed the conventional assumption that leisure is 
purely private when identifying the sharing rule in a framework of free labor/leisure 
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choice. We have developed a method of identifying the effect of z on the 
unobservable private leisure. An interesting result is that applying such a method, the 
net effect of z on the sharing rule of total private expenditure can still be recovered 
without observing the total private expenditure if the only omission of observation is 
the private leisure. Another interesting application is the identification of public 
leisure of a couple. Moreover, this thesis develops a method of identifying the sharing 
rule written in structural forms in case that unearned income of each member is 
reported. 
Finally, we carry out a general discussion on the possibility of identifying the 
sharing rule of total private expenditure when there is the omission of observation 
other than private leisure at either individual or household level. It is concluded that 
the identifiability ofthe sharing rule written as the fractions allocated to each member, 
p(.) relies on the estimation of rate of percentage change of total private expenditure 
with respect to z. A sufficient condition for identifiability is introduced which gives 




® ^ ^ , , ( z ) - C , ( z ) p ( z ) (A.1) 
and 字 = 仏 於 ( 懒 ) ， (A.2) 
^k 
where 碰 ^ ^ 切 ^ - 手 ] 
V dz^ dz, J 
Rk,h - {fi,h — L^h)， 
^^ln .^^ 
( “ z ) = ~ ^ ^ , a n d ^ 
" 、 跑 1 
“ 、 1 、 - 卞 . 
Consider a special case of(A.l): 
參 - ⑩ ⑷ . (A.3) 
^h 
It can be solved from (A.3) that: 
Rz) = Q (z_,) exp(- \Ch (z) dz,)， 
where z_,=z„....,z,_„z,,„....,md.C,{z_,) is a parameter independent ofz. 
This can be considered as a special case of 
p(z) = Q(z)exp(-j<',(z)^z,). (A.4) 
Differentiating (A.4), we get: 
学 = 学 exp(- J^ , (z)气) -Q(zK,(z)exp(- j f . ( z )气） 
^h ^h 
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= ^ exp(- J f , ( z )气) - C , ( z p ( z ) • (A.5) 
Substituting (A.5) into (A.1), it follows that: 
^ = ^ , , ( z ) e x p ( j a - ) d z , ) . (A.6) 
After integrating (A.6), Q(z) can be solved as: 
Q (z) = j^,,, (z) exp|^ jC, (z) dz, ^z , + c, (z_,) (A.7) 
where z_�Zi，....，A_i,�+i,m.. 
Substituting (A.7) into (A.4), it is implied that: 
H^) = - (c“z_J + j*<J^(z)exp(j*4(z) Jz,yz,jexp(|<-,(z) dzJ • (A.8) 
By taking partial derivative of (A.8) with respect to Zk and comparing terms with 
汰（z ) 
(A.2) we can solve the partial ^^  —" and thus further solve Ch{z-j^  in terms of a 
^k 
function of z (named as h(z) here) and a parameter, c h (z .h,k ) which is independent of 
Zk and Zh: 
Ch{z-h) = Kz) + Ch(z-h,k) (A.9) 
where z—；^,^  = _Zi,.. •., z^^_^, z^^^，• •. •, z^_^, z^+i，•. •. 
If we keep on taking partial derivative of (A.8) with respect to other z's, and 
comparing terms to the other solved equations of partial derivatives ofp , c h (z -h) can 
be eventually solved as a fiinction in terms of all z's, and a constant, namely 
Ch(7^-h)=_ + Ch (A.10) 
When this term is substituted back into (A.7), it is solved up to a parameter which is 
independent of Zk and Zh. 
p(z) = - (c, + H(z) + j^,,(z)exp( j f , (z ) Jz,yz,)exp( jC,(z)气).(A.11) 
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